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Although often conceptualized in contradictory terms, the common assumption that natural and supernatural
explanations are incompatible is psychologically inaccurate. Instead, there is considerable evidence that the
same individuals use both natural and supernatural explanations to interpret the very same events and that
there are multiple ways in which both kinds of explanations coexist in individual minds. Converging develop-
mental research from diverse cultural contexts in 3 areas of biological thought (i.e., the origin of species, illness,
and death) is reviewed to support this claim. Contrary to traditional accounts of cognitive development, new
evidence indicates that supernatural explanations often increase rather than decrease with age and supports the
proposal that reasoning about supernatural phenomena is an integral and enduring aspect of human cognition.
In Zandeland sometimes an old granary col-
lapses. There is nothing remarkable in this.
Every Zande knows that termites eat the sup-
ports in [the] course of time and that even the
hardest woods decay after years of service. Now
a granary is the summerhouse of a Zande home-
stead and people sit beneath it in the heat of the
day and chat or play the African hole-game or
work at some craft. Consequently it may happen
that there are people sitting beneath the granary
when it collapses and they are injured, for it is a
heavy structure made of beams and clay and
may be stored with millet as well. Now why
should these particular people have been sitting
under this particular granary at the particular
moment when it collapsed? That it should col-
lapse is easily intelligible, but why should it have
collapsed at the particular moment when these
particular people were sitting beneath it? (Evans-
Pritchard, 1937, p. 69)
As Evans-Pritchard (1937) observed, the Azande
fully understand that termite damage combined
with the granary’s own weight caused the structure
to collapse, and that on a hot day people might
well be sitting beneath it and be hurt or killed. One
could say that it was a coincidence of events, two
chains of causation intersected at a certain time and
in a certain place (Evans-Pritchard, 1937). Yet for
the Azande, the question of multiple causality
remains: Why these people at this moment and at
this place? The question is not simply one of
‘‘how’’ but of ‘‘why.’’ To answer the question of
‘‘why,’’ the Azande supplement their naturalistic
explanation of the collapse of the granary by invok-
ing supernatural forces: Witchcraft is used to
explain the unfortunate presence of the victims.
Access to natural as well as supernatural expla-
nations is not confined to the Azande. It is a perva-
sive experience across different cultures (Astuti,
Solomon, & Carey, 2004; Campbell, 1972; Evans,
Legare, & Rosengren, 2011). For example, with
regard to the origin of species Americans and Euro-
peans are exposed to a creationist account on the
one hand (i.e., God placed humans on earth) and
an evolutionary account on the other (i.e., humans
evolved from different kinds of living things;
Evans, 2001). Similarly, both biological and super-
natural explanations for the transmission and cure
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of serious illnesses are prevalent. In the developing
world, although information about the transmission
of the AIDS virus is widely available via health and
education programs (Legare & Gelman, 2009),
supernatural accounts of infection based on witch-
craft are promulgated (Ashforth, 2001; Farmer,
1999; Legare & Gelman, 2008). Finally, although
people must confront the biological inevitability
and finality of death for all living creatures, in
many religious traditions they are also invited to
believe in the prospect of an afterlife-at least, for
human beings (Astuti & Harris, 2008; Harris &
Gime´nez, 2005; Talwar, Harris, & Schleifer, 2011).
In spite of their dual prevalence, little is known
about how natural and supernatural explanations
codevelop or the extent to which children and
adults recruit and accommodate both to explain the
same events. We propose that understanding the
coexistence of natural and supernatural explana-
tions is fundamentally a cognitive developmental
endeavor and speaks to general questions of knowl-
edge acquisition, socialization, and the interaction
of cognition and culture. We review research dem-
onstrating that the coexistence of natural and
supernatural explanations is not a short-lived, tran-
sitional phenomenon that wanes in the course of
development but instead that coexistence thinking
is also evident and indeed widespread among
adults. Before proceeding further, we will frame
our discussion with working definitions of natural
and supernatural phenomena. For the most part,
we borrow from standard psychological usage. We
define natural as (in principle) observable and
empirically verifiable phenomena of the physical or
material world. We define supernatural as phenom-
ena that violate, operate outside of, or are distinct
from the realm of the natural world or known natu-
ral law. Even when a particular cause is unknown,
natural or physical mechanisms are assumed to
exist in the case of natural explanations and super-
natural mechanisms are assumed to exist in the
case of supernatural explanations. Rather than mak-
ing strong definitional claims about the distinction
between natural and supernatural phenomena, we
focus on the kinds of causes and practices that are
generally regarded as belonging to natural (e.g., sci-
ence, medicine, and biology) versus supernatural
(e.g., religion, divination, and witchcraft) kinds
from an intuitive, psychological perspective.
In both lay and scientific writing, natural or sci-
entific explanations on the one hand and supernat-
ural or religious explanations on the other are often
pitted against each other (Bloom, 1992; Dawkins,
2006; Preston & Epley, 2009) with the assumption
that scientific explanations may eventually prevail
due to their superiority at providing empirically
testable explanations. This view is also implied by
the secularization hypothesis, which states that as
science and technology advance they will increas-
ingly displace religious explanations (Norris &
Inglehart, 2004). An alternative to this displacement
account is that natural and supernatural explana-
tions do not overlap because they are used to
explain different types of phenomena (Biema, 2006;
Gould, 1997). However, contrary to the displace-
ment account and in contrast to nonoverlap, we
propose that these two explanatory frameworks
often coexist within the same individual, and may
both be recruited even with respect to the same
phenomenon.
In this review, we examine how children and
adults respond to distinct natural and supernatural
explanatory accounts of the world around them.
We propose that although in some contemporary
cases they are represented as competing and mutu-
ally exclusive accounts (e.g., Biblical literalist
accounts of God creating the world in 7 days vs.
evolutionary accounts of the diversity of life evolv-
ing over millions of years), natural and supernatu-
ral explanations are frequently used by both
children and adults in a complementary rather than
an exclusive manner.
In this respect, we propose a different stance
from long traditions of thinking and research in
developmental and cultural psychology. In devel-
opmental psychology, it has been claimed that
young children gradually abandon a belief in
supernatural causation and instead acquire a more
objective, rational, or scientific appreciation of
cause and effect (Harris, 2009; Piaget, 1928). In cul-
tural psychology, a classic body of early research
was taken to show that the twin engines of educa-
tion and modernization accelerate various aspects
of cognitive development (Luria, 1934, 1971, 1976;
Vygotsky, 1978). In combination, these two lines of
developmental research point to the possibility that,
in the course of history, with more widespread
access to education and modernity, a focus on
natural explanations will increasingly compete
with, and even displace, adherence to supernatural
explanations, consistent with the secularization
hypothesis. However, relatively few adults, across
a wide range of cultural backgrounds, endorse
an exclusively natural stance, stripped of all refer-
ences to the supernatural (Campbell, 1972; Misztal
& Shupe, 1992; Raman & Winer, 2004; Tambiah,
1990). How can the traditional view of cognitive
development be reconciled with the fact that
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supernatural explanations are present in many
cultural contexts and are a pervasive feature of
cognition for most adults?
An intuitively plausible psychological explana-
tion for this paradox is that these distinct explana-
tory frameworks operate differently in different
individuals (i.e., some individuals are more
scientific or religious than others) or at least over
different domains or contexts (i.e., an individual
may hold scientific explanations for certain phe-
nomena, and supernatural explanations for other
phenomena). However, the proposal discussed in
this article is that both natural and supernatural
explanations frequently operate within the same
mind to explain the very same event or phenome-
non. We argue that supernatural explanations do
not always appear early in development; nor are
they primitive or immature ways of thinking that
are suppressed over the course of development.
Instead, like natural explanations, they are con-
structed and elaborated through socialization and
cultural learning and may be founded on earlier
intuitive explanations.
In contrast to the developmental pattern described
by Piaget, we will propose that in certain domains,
the tendency to invoke supernatural explanations
increases with age rather than decreases (Astuti &
Harris, 2008; Evans, 2001; Harris & Gime´nez, 2005;
Legare & Gelman, 2008; Mead, 1940; Raman & Gel-
man, 2004; Woolley, Cornelius, & Lacy, 2011).
Indeed, in line with sociocultural perspectives on
development (Cole, 2005; Rogoff, 2003; Vygotsky,
1978), we argue that the development of both natu-
ral and supernatural explanatory systems requires a
considerable amount of cultural experience and par-
ticipation in dynamic aspects of the social learning
process, in which children seek out and actively
construct information in collaboration with others
(Callanan, 2006; Harris & Koenig, 2006). Conse-
quently, both natural and supernatural explanations
can operate within the same mind (Subbotsky,
2001), and crucially, for the same to-be-explained
phenomena. For example, a person might explain
AIDS using witchcraft in one instance, biology
in another, or combine the two in a third instance.
Similarly, a person might explain the sequelae of
death using a religious framework in one instance, a
biological framework in another, or combine the
two frameworks in a third instance. Thus, when
faced with different explanatory frameworks—
including those that are potentially in conflict with
one another—adults and children might endorse
both, either by recruiting them in different contexts,
by ignoring potential contradictions, or by finding
ways to combine and coordinate them. In the final
discussion, we return to the question of when and
to what extent such strategies are adopted.
Exploring Functional Similarities
One reason to posit that people may use both natu-
ral and supernatural explanations to explain the
same events is that they can serve a similar func-
tion. Each offers an ‘‘attempt to explain and influ-
ence the working of one’s everyday world by
discovering the constant principles that underlie
the apparent chaos and flux of sensory experience’’
(Horton, 1979, p. 355). Both natural and supernatu-
ral explanatory frameworks can provide answers to
the same core questions of fundamental interest to
humans. For example, both evolution and creation-
ism explain the origin of human beings, both bio-
medicine and witchcraft explain the causes of
serious illness, and both biology and religion
explain what happens when we die. Given the
shared objectives of natural and supernatural cog-
nition—that is, to enable us to explain, understand,
and intervene in the world—there is much to be
gained by investigating whether and how far a sin-
gle cognitive system can entertain both kinds of
thinking, even with respect to the same phenome-
non.
Exploring the interplay between natural and
supernatural explanations offers a new perspec-
tive on the question of how humans represent
knowledge. The development of organized,
explanatory systems of knowledge is an integral
part of human cognition and a fundamental
developmental task. Although a well-established,
wide-ranging, and influential body of research
exists on the development of reasoning in natural
domains (Carey, 2009; Gopnik & Schulz, 2007;
Keil, 1992; Kuhn, 1989; Wellman & Gelman, 1992)
and on the development of causal explanatory
reasoning in particular (Chi, DeLeeuw, Chiu, &
LaVancher, 1994; Crowley & Siegler, 1999; Frazier,
Gelman, & Wellman, 2009; Gopnik, 2000; Keil,
2006; Keil & Wilson, 2000; Legare, 2012; Legare,
Gelman, & Wellman, 2010; Legare, Wellman, &
Gelman, 2009; Lombrozo, 2006; Wellman, 2012;
Wellman, Hickling, & Schult, 1997) there has been
less sustained and systematic research on the
development of thinking about supernatural or
divine powers (but see recent findings by Barrett,
2000; Barrett, Richert, & Driesenga, 2001; Bering,
2006; Harris & Koenig, 2006; Lane, Wellman, &
Evans, 2010; McCauley, 2000; Rosengren, Johnson,
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& Harris, 2000; Woolley, 2000). In particular,
investigators have rarely asked whether, and more
importantly, how these different forms of thinking
coexist in the minds of children and adults. Possi-
ble explanations for the dearth of research on this
pervasive feature of human cognition is that
supernatural thinking was traditionally viewed as
not amenable to empirical investigation (Rosen-
gren et al., 2000) and that much of the conven-
tional research in developmental psychology
decontextualized the study of cognitive develop-
ment (Callanan, 2006; Cole, 2005; Rogoff, 2003).
Our rationale for discussing the prevalence of
coexisting explanatory frameworks for human ori-
gins, illness, and death is that both natural and
supernatural explanations are highly salient in
each, arguably because the three domains share a
number of properties. First, each phenomenon can
be attributed to hidden or unobservable causal
agents. Second, each is associated with strong emo-
tions. With respect to illness and death these emo-
tions arise from the loss or potential loss of loved
ones. With respect to human origins, the emotions
surround the belief that humans are somehow spe-
cial and different from other organisms (Evans,
2001) or that acceptance of evolution implies a
range of negative outcomes (e.g., Brem, Ranney, &
Schindel, 2003; Evans, 2008) including the possible
extinction of the human species (Poling & Evans,
2004). Finally, human origins, illness, and death are
embedded in specific cultural practices and narra-
tives that predate our current scientific understand-
ing of these concepts and continue to coexist
alongside our scientific knowledge.
In each of these three domains, supernatural
agency is frequently invoked—either a unique spe-
cial being (God) or a set of special beings (witches,
ancestors). Like ordinary humans, these beings have
the capacity to observe, make decisions, and act but
unlike ordinary humans, they are also believed to
possess unusual causal powers that can bring about
extraordinary or otherwise impossible outcomes.
Although we focus on three examples of coexis-
tence thinking, we anticipate that coexistence think-
ing is a pervasive feature of human cognition. We
acknowledge that the question of which particular
domains motivate such thinking is an empirical one
and that the kind of data that might provide a
definitive answer to this question are not currently
available. Nevertheless, we note that several other
domains appear to be characterized by the same
kinds of coexistence thinking. For example, within
the domain of biology, the phenomenon of procre-
ation is often framed in terms of both natural and
supernatural factors (Emmons, 2010). More specifi-
cally, from the moment of conception, the develop-
ment of the fetus is widely believed in many
cultural contexts to have both biological (body) and
supernatural (soul) properties. Moreover, preven-
tion or termination of that developmental process is
often seen as having supernatural or religious as
well as natural consequences.
Parallel examples can also be identified outside
of the domain of biology. For example, in the eyes
of believers, special beings play a major role in the
designation, punishment, and absolution of human
wrongdoing. Perpetrators and their accusers often
conceive of wrongdoing in terms of a supernatural
as well as a natural or secular framework. Thus,
wrongdoing is analyzed in ordinary psychological
or judicial terms but it can also be analyzed in light
of the capacity of special beings to exercise their
extraordinary powers. Special beings are thought to
punish or absolve wrongdoing in ways that no
human being is capable of. Indeed, such powers
are central to the belief systems of those who
believe in the existence of God, witches, or the
ancestors. Marriage is another domain that appears
to motivate coexistence thinking. In many cultural
contexts, marriage is conceptualized both in secular
terms (i.e., the joining of two individuals in a legal
union) and in supernatural terms (i.e., the union of
two souls under God). Sanctions for maintaining
and protecting this institution are also both secular
and supernatural in nature (infidelity is conceptual-
ized in natural terms as disloyalty and in supernat-
ural terms as a sin).
In the next section, we review developmental
and cross-cultural data showing that the use of nat-
ural and supernatural explanations to explain the
same events is pervasive and that supernatural
explanations often increase rather than decline with
age. We also illustrate how these explanations are
accommodated, integrated, and reconciled by
reviewing explanations for biological origins among
Christian fundamentalist groups in the United
States (Evans, 2001); explanations for illness in
South Africa (Legare & Gelman, 2008), India
(Raman & Gelman, 2004), and Vietnamese- and
Euro-American populations in the United States
(Nguyen & Rosengren, 2004); as well as explana-
tions for death in Madagascar (Astuti & Harris,
2008), Spain (Harris & Gime´nez, 2005), China
(Brent, Speece, Lin, Dong, & Yang, 1996), and Mex-
ico (Rosengren et al., 2009). Next, we first briefly
outline three different ways in which natural and
supernatural explanatory frameworks are brought
to bear on a single phenomenon.
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Explanatory Coexistence Across Diverse Cultural
Contexts and Domains
In response to a question about a single event or
object of explanation, individuals might recruit dif-
ferent explanatory frameworks in various ways
(Table 1). One possibility is that natural and super-
natural domains remain alternative views of the
world. Even if both are recruited in order to pro-
vide a coherent explanation of a given phenome-
non, they are used to explain distinct aspects of
that phenomenon, depending on the particular
mode of response or kind of causal attribution. We
label this target-dependent thinking (Table 1). For
example, a natural framework might be used to
explain the breakdown of all bodily processes at
death whereas a supernatural framework might
be used to explain the continued existence of the
spirit or soul after death. The subsequent analysis
of death concepts in Spain, Mexico, and Madagas-
car provides evidence for the use of such target-
dependent thinking. Supernatural or religious
explanations are more likely to be offered for the
continuation of the soul or spirit whereas biological
explanations are more likely to be offered for the
cessation of bodily processes (Astuti & Harris,
2008; Harris, 2011; Harris & Gime´nez, 2005). Simi-
larly, in the case of reasoning about the origin of
diverse species, an evolutionary framework might
be recruited to explain the origin of nonhuman
species whereas a theistic framework might be
recruited to explain the creation of human beings.
A second possibility is that natural and supernat-
ural frameworks are brought together to explain a
given phenomenon. In this type of thinking, two
different forms of explanation are invoked. Such
dual explanations may involve a loose integration
of natural and supernatural frameworks but with-
out any detailed consideration of how they would
interact. We refer to this as synthetic thinking (Vos-
niadou, Vamvakoussi, & Skopeliti, 2008, Table 1).
For example, in the domains of serious illness and
death, synthetic reasoning acknowledges distinct
explanatory frameworks, but not in a clearly
integrated manner. Thus, one might invoke both
witchcraft and unsafe sexual practices to explain
contracting AIDS (Legare & Gelman, 2008) or
biological decay and spiritual metamorphosis to
explain what happens after death (Harris & Gime´nez,
2005) without specifying how the two forms of
explanation fit together.
A third possibility is that explanations of a single
phenomenon are combined in a more precise fash-
ion; we refer to cases of such well-coordinated
explanations as integrated thinking (Table 1). Integration
can be achieved by using natural and supernatural
Table 1
Examples of Coexistence Thinking
Label Integrative thinking Synthetic thinking Target-dependent thinking
Definition Two different explanations are
integrated into a single explanation
Two different explanations are
combined into a single explanation
without explicit integration
Two different explanations remain
alternative views of the world,
recruited to explain distinct aspects
of a given phenomenon, depending
on the target or context
Origins ‘‘[Humans] got here from gorillas and
monkeys, cause they’re intelligent
creatures if you really look at them . . .
The first monkeys probably evolved
from something else or got put here as
an individual . . . God could have put
them [the monkeys] here’’
(Evans, 2000)
‘‘Well, again, evolution with the
environment, but I am also a
religious person, so that’s a difficult
question. I think a bit of both perhaps
. . .’’ (Adult: Evans et al., 2010)
‘‘Man is created with a soul, which
makes him different from an
animal—that can be found in the
book of Genesis. And um, so I would
consider a monkey an animal without
an eternal soul . . .’’ (Adult: Evans
et al., 2010)
Illness ‘‘A witch can put you in the way of
viruses and germs’’ (Legare &
Gelman, 2008)
‘‘It might be witchcraft and having
unprotected sex’’ (Legare & Gelman,
2008)
‘‘Witchcraft can cause a disease that
looks like AIDS’’ (Legare & Gelman,
2008)
Death ‘‘If she is in Heaven she will be with
other people and she will
communicate with them. It is as if
you are brought back to life because
God bring you back to life to be with
him’’ (Harris & Gime´nez, 2005)
‘‘Even if she doesn’t use her heart, up
in Heaven there is something special
that makes the rest of your body
work; it is like magic’’ (Harris &
Gime´nez, 2005)
‘‘Because if she is with God I guess
she could see and hear. Her soul is
alive even if her body is buried’’
(Harris & Gime´nez, 2005)
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explanations for different levels of analysis. For
example, a natural cause can be regarded as proxi-
mate, and a supernatural cause as ultimate. Thus,
in the case of theistic evolution, Darwinian natural
selection is regarded as proximate whereas the Cre-
ator is regarded as ultimate. Similarly, in the case
of AIDS, unprotected sex is regarded as a proxi-
mate cause whereas witchcraft is regarded as the
ultimate cause (e.g., witches are believed to be
capable of distorting your sense of good judgment
or putting an AIDS-infected person in your path;
Legare & Gelman, 2008).
Next, we systematically examine explanatory
coexistence in the domains of origins, illness, and
death. We then consider what conclusions can be
drawn across these three different domains and
discuss directions for future research.
Using Multiple Epistemologies to Reason About
the Origin of Species
Explanations for the origin of species provide an
instructive context for studying the coexistence of
natural and supernatural explanatory frameworks.
In a 2007 Gallup Poll, 24% of the U.S. public
endorsed the idea that ‘‘humans evolved from ear-
lier forms of life’’ but those same respondents also
endorsed the idea ‘‘that humans were created in
their present form . . . within the past 10,000 years.’’
How could such apparently contradictory explana-
tions be entertained by the same people (Evans
et al., 2011)?
Theologians have been wrestling with these
questions ever since Darwin introduced his theory
of evolution, which contradicted the prevailing and
apparently self-evident view that living kinds were
designed and created by God (Miller, 1999; Scott,
2004). Nevertheless, as evolutionary ideas have
seeped into the broader cultural milieu, individuals
from a variety of religious contexts have found
ways of accommodating such contradictory ideas
(e.g., Numbers, 1992). Members of the general pub-
lic, for example, often adopt target-dependent
thinking, in which humans were created, while
other species evolved, a pattern found in about 30%
of adolescents and adults (Evans, 2000, 2001). More-
over, explanations of evolutionary origins are more
likely to be assigned to animals that are taxonomi-
cally distant from humans, particularly animals that
undergo metamorphosis (Evans, 2008).
Typically, in these studies, the term evolution
was not used, because children (who would not
have heard of the term), as well as adults, were
participants; moreover, the focus was on the more
controversial evolutionary theory, that of common
descent, which holds that one kind of animal des-
cended from a completely different kind and that
all living creatures have an ancestor in common.
For example, in a study of over 100 elementary
school children and their parents from diverse
(Midwestern) Christian religions, participants were
asked how much they agreed with an evolutionary
explanation that humans, other mammals, frogs
and butterflies: ‘‘changed from a different kind of
animal that used to live on earth’’ (Evans, 2008).
Overall, there were developmental changes, with
older children (8- to 10-year-olds) and adults from
nonfundamentalist Christian families more likely to
agree with ‘‘evolutionary’’ change than younger
children (5- to 7-year-olds). Nevertheless, all age
groups, regardless of religious background, were
more likely to agree that mammals ‘‘evolved’’ than
that humans evolved, and more likely to agree that
butterflies and frogs evolved than that mammals
evolved. The reverse pattern was found for the cre-
ationist explanation that ‘‘Somebody made X . . . ,’’
with creationism more likely to be applied to
humans and least likely to be applied to insects
(Evans, 2008). Religious affiliation was also critical,
with members of Christian Fundamentalist families
more likely to endorse creationism and much less
likely to endorse common descent, a position con-
sistent with their theological stance.
Thus, with increasing experience of the relevant
cultural stances, children and adults identify more
nuanced targets, in line with changes in both their
natural and supernatural explanatory frameworks.
In the case of the creationist framework, the early
developing idea that people (but not necessarily
other animals) were created, may eventually cede
to a fine-grained distinction, consistent with target-
dependent thinking, in which the human soul is
created, whereas the body evolved (see Table 1). In
the case of the evolutionary framework, a common-
sense early understanding is that evolutionary
change is like developmental change, with animals
that undergo radical developmental change, such
as metamorphosis, more likely to have evolved.
This (often) cedes to the more scientifically valid
explanation that natural selection explains evolu-
tionary change in all living things (Evans, 2008).
Pope John Paul II (1997) articulated a version of this
target-dependent model, in which the human soul
was created, while the human body evolved.
Even among populations who are the most resis-
tant to theories of evolution there is evidence for
explanatory coexistence. Creationists, who comprise
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roughly 30% of the U.S. population (Doyle, 2003),
endorse a literal interpretation of the Bible in which
each kind of animal owes its origins and its essen-
tial nature to God. However, some creationists
agree with biologists that natural selection is a key
mechanism of evolutionary change, provided it is
used to explain change within a species, not their
origins. Again, this is an example of target-depen-
dent thinking because within-species variation and
the origins of any given species are treated as sepa-
rate phenomena (Darwin was the first to link them;
Evans, 2008). This accommodation is most often
voiced by Christian Fundamentalist scholars, as in
the following example: ‘‘. . . The only complaint that
creationists have . . . is the confusing use of the term
‘‘evolution’’ to describe both variation within a spe-
cies and the origins of new kinds of life. . . . The
fact that one can mix existing genes to get some
variation in species doesn’t prove that genes arise
naturally to create new kinds of creatures’’ (Jones,
2005).
Further examples of coexistence thinking amongst
creationist members of the public were found in a
study of highly educated adult visitors (more than
60% had a college degree) to Midwestern natural
history museums. In this sample, 22% were crea-
tionist for humans only, with a further 6% consis-
tently creationist, regardless of species. The latter
group, the consistent creationists argued that by
building diversity into the genes of each living
kind, God designed the conditions whereby each
pair of animals placed on Noah’s Ark had the
capacity to change in response to local contingen-
cies via natural selection. Thus, the original wolf-
dog pair on the Ark eventually gave rise to all the
dogs on earth, from dachshunds to dingoes (Evans
et al., 2010). In this nuanced stance, naturalistic and
supernatural explanations were explicitly inte-
grated to explain a single phenomenon, within-
species diversity. In contrast, examples of the less
well-integrated reasoning pattern, synthetic thinking
(see Table 1) were more likely to be found among
those visitors who were not consistently creationist,
suggesting that this reasoning pattern represents a
less coherent framework.
One of the more enduring ways that individuals
reconcile naturalistic and supernatural explanations
for the origins of species is to combine these explan-
atory systems into a causal chain, as in theistic evo-
lution (Evans, 2008). In this example of integrated
thinking, common among nonfundamentalist theo-
logians (Ruse, 2005; Scott, 2004), God becomes the
distal or ultimate cause of evolutionary change by
setting in motion the natural laws that govern the
origins of living kinds. This contrasts with the
creationism of some Christian Fundamentalists in
which God is the proximate cause of these
events—a grand designer who directly creates the
essential nature (the DNA) of each kind of animal
found on earth, as described above. Children may
express less complex versions of integrated
thinking (see Table 1); younger children (5- to 7-
year-olds) tend to focus on the proximate causes of
events, while older children (8- to 10-year-olds)
combine distal and proximate causes into a causal
chain (Evans, 2000, 2001). For example, when asked
‘‘How do you think the very first chair got here on
earth?’’ 5- to 7-year-olds from mixed religious com-
munities in the Midwest responded with: ‘‘from the
store’’ and ‘‘God made it,’’ whereas 8- to 12-year-
olds, from the same communities, responded: ‘‘God
makes trees so we can cut the trees down and make
chairs out of wood’’ and ‘‘God gave people the idea
to make a chair’’ (Evans, 2008). In this developmen-
tal trajectory, the links of the causal chain appear to
become more numerous, more interconnected, and
more complex, with increasing age (cf. Mull &
Evans, 2010). It may well be that an increasing
grasp of the fundamentals of both natural and
supernatural explanatory frameworks sets the stage
for changes in the developmental trajectories of tar-
get-dependent and integrated thinking, whereas
synthetic thinking appears to be symptomatic of a
less reflective form of coexistence thinking.
Using Multiple Epistemologies to Reason
About Illness
The potential coexistence of natural and supernatu-
ral explanatory systems within the same individual
can be fruitfully investigated in cultural settings
where both kinds of explanations are prevalent.
The AIDS crisis in South Africa provides such a
context. In South Africa, multiple approaches to ill-
ness are available, including traditional folk medi-
cine, faith healing, and modern biomedical services
(Ashforth, 2001). Perhaps the most prominent
supernatural explanation for AIDS in South Africa
is that of witchcraft, or the practices of persons with
malicious intent to cause harm through the use of
harmful substances and invisible supernatural
forces (Ashforth, 2001). Witchcraft is used as an
explanatory framework for dealing with ill will,
envy, suspicion, and other universal, human feel-
ings and behaviors (Evans-Pritchard, 1937). Witch-
craft is often associated with muthi (sejeso in
Sesotho), or the malicious manipulation of herbs
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and other substances, and is believed to cause a
wide variety of misfortunes ranging from unem-
ployment and interpersonal discord to illness and
death.
To investigate age differences in the coexistence
of natural and supernatural explanations for ill-
ness, Legare and Gelman (2008) examined biologi-
cal and witchcraft explanations for AIDS in South
Africa. Although traditional accounts of young
children’s explanations of illness described chil-
dren as appealing to immanent justice explana-
tions and therefore lacking a biological framework
for interpreting illness (Kister & Patterson, 1980),
more recent research has demonstrated that even
young children have complex and often elaborate
beliefs about biological processes (Inagaki & Hat-
ano, 2002; Keil, 1992; Legare et al., 2009; Wellman
et al., 1997). Given that children have access to
biological explanations at young ages, how do
they reason about and accommodate seemingly
inconsistent nonbiological (supernatural) explana-
tions?
One possibility is that children will become more
biologically accurate with age: Biological explana-
tions may increase, and witchcraft explanations
may decrease as participants gain knowledge and
experience. This first possibility would be consis-
tent with most standard theories of development
(and the secularization hypothesis mentioned ear-
lier) that predict increasing biological knowledge
and accuracy with age. In contrast, a second possi-
bility is that young children may actually provide
more biological explanations and fewer witchcraft
explanations than older children and adults, consis-
tent with the idea that biological explanations may
be a default or early emerging explanation for ill-
ness that is gradually supplemented or replaced by
other kinds of explanations as children acquire
culturally specific explanatory models (Harris &
Gime´nez, 2005; Nguyen & Rosengren, 2004; Raman
& Gelman, 2004; Raman & Winer, 2004). The data
support a third possibility and more complex inter-
action: Witchcraft explanations for AIDS may
decrease with age (due to direct educational pro-
grams in school) but then rise again as participants
are further removed from their years in school
(Legare & Gelman, 2008). This would result in a
U-shaped curve (Raman & Winer, 2004), with
witchcraft explanations decreasing among older
children and adolescents and increasing again
among adults.
In two studies, participants (5-, 7-, 11-, and 15-
year-olds and adults; N = 366) were drawn from
two Sesotho-speaking, South African communities
where Western biomedical and traditional healing
frameworks are both widely available (Legare &
Gelman, 2008). Participants were given a variety of
vignettes describing characters diagnosed with
AIDS and then provided with a variety of different
biological and supernatural explanations for why
they had been infected, explanations that they
could individually endorse or reject. A strength
of this design was that participants could reject or
endorse all or none of the explanations, or reject
some and endorse others. Results indicated that
biological explanations were endorsed at high
levels (i.e., participants of all age groups agreed
with biological explanations for at least one vign-
ette). Nevertheless, witchcraft explanations were
also frequently supported among children and ado-
lescents, and universally among adults. Bewitch-
ment explanations for at least one vignette were
endorsed by 47% of 5-year-olds, 59% of 7-year-olds,
47% of 11-year-olds, 34% of 15-year-olds, and 100%
of adults. Importantly, bewitchment explanations
were not the result of ignorance of biological
causes. Thus, they existed alongside and were not
replaced by biological explanations.
In a third study on the effects of contextual prim-
ing on the recruitment of natural and supernatural
explanations to explain the same outcome or event,
adolescent and adult participants provided expla-
nations for vignettes in which the type of contex-
tual information about the characters who had been
afflicted by AIDS was systematically varied (Legare
& Gelman, 2008). There were four conditions that
differed in the kind of explanatory system that was
primed: biological only, bewitchment only, both
biological and bewitchment, and neither. Impor-
tantly, participants were sensitive to the narrative
context of the illness in question, recruiting one or
both kinds of explanation in their responses
to open-ended questions, depending on whether
biological or witchcraft explanations were primed.
Biological explanations were the default explana-
tory system for interpreting AIDS when neither
system was primed. However, when attention was
drawn to socially risky behaviors (e.g., lack of gen-
erosity or jealousy) believed to put someone at risk
for witchcraft attacks, participants gave primarily
witchcraft explanations for AIDS.
This research provided evidence for each kind of
coexistence thinking. Evidence for target-dependent
thinking was found in explanations indicating that
different forms of the same illness could have either
natural or supernatural origins. More specifically,
although certain forms of AIDS may have a biologi-
cal explanation, witchcraft can cause an equally
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deadly disease that mimics AIDS. For example,
participants stated, ‘‘Witchcraft can cause a disease
that looks like AIDS’’ or ‘‘To medical doctors it
seems like AIDS but it is not. The spell was
supposed to look like AIDS.’’ The notion of ‘‘super-
natural AIDS’’ is arguably a reaction to the infor-
mation people receive from AIDS education
programs indicating explicitly that witchcraft does
not cause AIDS, enabling them to maintain witch-
craft as an explanatory system for illness and
misfortune generally (Ashforth, 2001). Twenty-six
percent of participants provided such a target-
dependent explanation at least once (Legare &
Gelman, 2008).
Evidence for synthetic thinking was found in
additive explanations indicating that both biological
risk factors and witchcraft could explain AIDS, but
not in a clearly integrated manner. For example,
‘‘Witchcraft, which is mixed with evil spirits, and
having unprotected sex caused AIDS.’’ Fifty-seven
percent of participants provided a synthetic expla-
nation at least once (Legare & Gelman, 2008).
Finally, there was also evidence for integrated
thinking. Most typically, in explanations of this
kind, the proximate cause was identified as unpro-
tected sex, whereas the final cause is believed to be
witchcraft. For example, witches are believed to be
capable of distorting your sense of good judgment
or putting an AIDS-infected person in your path
(Legare & Gelman, 2008). Thirty-eight percent of
participants provided an integrated explanation at
least once (Legare & Gelman, 2008).
Evidence for the coexistence of biological and
supernatural thinking in explaining illness is not
confined to developing countries nor to explana-
tions of AIDS. For example, research with Vietnam-
ese-American populations has shown that they
believe in a mixture of biological and magical
causes and remedies (Rutledge, 1992). Thus, Viet-
namese-Americans have been found to cite germs,
evil spirits, and magic spells as potential causes of
illness and medical physicians, traditional healers,
and sorcerers with magical powers as potential
agents for curing illness. The findings that Vietnam-
ese-Americans hold steadfast to their cultural tradi-
tions, teaching their children about traditional
Vietnamese culture, sharing folk stories, and speak-
ing Vietnamese in the home would suggest that
these explanations are also transmitted to their chil-
dren (Rutledge, 1992). To examine this possibility,
Nguyen and Rosengren (2004) investigated ideas
about illness among Vietnamese-American and
European-American participants. Children (aged
4–7 years) and adults were asked to make causal
attributions for a series of illness-related stories
(Study 1) and were asked about the causes of and
remedies for illness (Study 2). Biological causality
was the dominant form of reasoning about illness
across the different ages and cultural groups. Nev-
ertheless, as in the research on AIDS conducted in
South Africa, magical causality was endorsed by
children of both cultural groups and by Vietnam-
ese-Americans adults.
Research by Raman and Gelman (2004) provides
converging evidence for the coexistence of biologi-
cal and supernatural explanations at the level of the
individual mind in a cross-cultural study of expla-
nations for illness in India and the United States.
Moral ontologies for illness are widely endorsed in
India and are based on supernatural phenomena
including fate, ‘‘karma,’’ and God’s will (Shweder,
Much, Mahapatra, & Park, 1997). Indian and Amer-
ican participants (preschool, first grade, third
grade, fifth grade, and college students) were pre-
sented with vignettes that described symptoms of
illnesses. Participants in both countries were
presented with biological and nonbiological, super-
natural explanations for each of the illnesses.
Results indicated that across all ages in both coun-
tries although the biological model was the most
prominent, supernatural explanations were also
endorsed, by the same individuals, for the same
events. There was also evidence for an increase in
supernatural explanations with age. For example,
Indian adults acknowledged significantly more
moral and psychological causes than younger
children.
Using Multiple Epistemologies to Reason
About Death
Although a substantial amount of research has been
done on children’s biological understanding of
death, relatively little is known about the develop-
ment of nonbiological and supernatural beliefs
about death. Research on conceptions of death has
primarily focused on children’s emerging grasp of
the biological life cycle (Slaughter & Lyons, 2003).
Investigators have asked when children come to
realize that for all living things, death is inevitable,
irreversible, and implies the cessation of living
functions. Although there is some disagreement
about the exact timetable of development, there is a
broad consensus that children increasingly grasp
these biological facts in the course of early and
middle childhood (Kenyon, 2001). Nevertheless, a
belief in the afterlife is widespread among adult
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populations, including those in the United States
and Western Europe (Greeley & Hout, 1999). By
implication, despite their eventual understanding
of the biological facts of death, including the inevi-
table cessation of living functions, children and
adolescents also come to the conclusion that some
form of afterlife is possible. Indeed, indications of
this conclusion can be found even in studies that
have targeted children’s biological understanding.
For example, Brent and his colleagues interviewed
American and Chinese children ranging from pre-
schoolers through to adolescents (Brent et al., 1996)
concerning death (i.e., its finality, universality, cau-
sation, and irreversibility), and the continuity of life
processes following death. Although by the age of
6 virtually all of the children agreed that everybody
will die, that a dead person can neither come alive
again nor do any of the things that he or she once
did, this consensus was less evident among young
adolescents. More than one third claimed that some
form of continued existence was possible. Moreover,
when asked to explain how a dead person might
continue to do certain things, 15-year-olds, both in
China and the United States, typically offered reli-
gious explanations. For example, they cited the con-
tinued existence of the soul, the possibility of
reincarnation, or God’s power. By implication, older
children were constructing a nonbiological, religious
conception of death.
Research by Rosengren et al. (2009) provides
additional cross-cultural evidence from Mexican-
American and Euro-American preschool children
showing that although a biological explanation is
often the default explanatory system for interpret-
ing death (as in the domain of illness), signs of
coexistence reasoning are apparent, including both
target-dependent and synthetic thinking.
Some recent studies have systematically probed
children’s religious conception of death as well as
their biological conception (Harris, 2011). This
research has shown that in line with the findings
for reasoning about AIDS, individuals are sensitive
to specific aspects of the context in their thinking.
For example, when presented with a narrative
highlighting the biological aspects of death (e.g.,
the unsuccessful efforts of doctors to save the dead
person) both children and adults are likely to assert
that living functions, and particularly bodily func-
tions, have ceased. By contrast, when presented
with a narrative highlighting the spiritual aspects
of death (e.g., a religious figure or ceremony),
respondents are more likely to assert that living
functions, and particularly spiritual or mental func-
tions, continue.
Evidence for this type of target-dependent coex-
istence thinking has been found among children
growing up in the predominantly Catholic culture
of Madrid, Spain (Harris & Gime´nez, 2005) and also
among Vezo children and adults of Western Mada-
gascar, who worship and placate the ancestors
(Astuti & Harris, 2008). There was no evidence in
either cultural setting that the consolidation of a
biological understanding of death precludes or
undermines a belief in the afterlife (whether con-
ceived in terms of the Christian Heaven or the life
of the ancestors). Conversely, there was also no
evidence that the gradual construction of a religious
conception undermines children’s biological under-
standing. On the contrary, Harris and Gime´nez
(2005) found that older children (i.e., 11-year-olds)
were more rather than less likely than younger chil-
dren (i.e., 7-year-olds) to engage in coexistence rea-
soning by invoking both conceptions of death at
different points in the interview. For example,
when justifying the cessation of bodily functioning,
children gave biological explanations referring to
the breakdown of internal organs (‘‘The heart
doesn’t beat and it can’t distribute blood through
the body and the organs’’) or to the process of bod-
ily decay (‘‘Because he is dead and the body dis-
integrates until there is only the skeleton left’’).
However, when justifying the continued operation
of mental processes children frequently invoked
God (‘‘In heaven everything can work even if she is
dead. God is credited to give you that’’) or the soul
(‘‘She is still alive in her soul’’). Some children went
beyond such examples of target-dependent reason-
ing to provide examples of synthetic reasoning.
Instead of invoking biological and supernatural
considerations at different points in the interview,
for example, when discussing the fate of the body
versus the mind, they brought both types of consid-
eration together to offer a loose but inclusive
account of both the biological and spiritual conse-
quences of death. For example, a 7-year-old who
had claimed that the body no longer functions after
death explained: ‘‘Because without blood, the skull
can’t move. In Heaven he can [move] because he is
like an angel but without wings.’’ Similarly, an 11-
year-old who had claimed that the body no longer
functions explained: ‘‘If she is dead, the body can’t
work. She can’t walk—she can’t do things. The soul
is the only active part.’’ Thus, each child invoked
biological and religious considerations in quick suc-
cession so as to justify different conclusions—the
cessation of functioning granted biological consid-
erations but some continued functioning granted
religious considerations.
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Examples of fully integrated thinking were rare
in this study. Admittedly, the children were 7 and
11 years of age and it is plausible that adolescents
and adults are better able to integrate the conflict-
ing implications of the two frameworks. On the
other hand, ethnographic data suggest that even
among adults, a fully integrated and coherent
account of death and the afterlife may be difficult
to achieve. Thus, writing of Vezo adults, Astuti
comments: ‘‘Most people found it hard to articulate
what kind of existence the ancestors enjoy. . . .
Some were indifferent even skeptical novices,
whereas others struggled to produce a coherent
account and readily gave up by asserting: ‘‘I don’t
know, I have never been dead’’ (Astuti, 2011, p.
17).
Finally, it should be noted that some studies
have suggested that expectations of continued func-
tioning after death decline in the wake of greater
biological understanding. However, participants in
those studies were questioned about a dead mouse
rather than a human being (Bering & Bjorklund,
2004). Beliefs in the afterlife normally focus on
human beings and not on animals (Poling & Evans,
2004). Consistent with this consideration, Astuti
and Harris (2008) found that when respondents
were asked about the death of a human being,
adults were more likely than children to assert the
continued functioning of mental processes after
death.
Conclusions and Future Research
The coordination of natural and supernatural expla-
nations poses a universal cognitive challenge.
Within highly educated, industrialized communi-
ties, supernatural explanations persist; a consider-
able number of individuals endorse supernatural
phenomena, ranging from God to ghosts and the
afterlife (Evans, 2000). Within highly traditional,
nonindustrialized communities, natural explana-
tions are equally pervasive; folk-biological explana-
tions are widely endorsed for inheritance (Astuti
et al., 2004) or the total cessation of function after
death (Astuti, 2007). Thus, we propose that the
cognitive task of coordinating multiple explanatory
frameworks is a general cognitive problem. Despite
cultural differences in the content of particular
belief systems, people in all societies are faced with
the task of conceptualizing potentially contradic-
tory explanations for biological phenomena.
We have provided evidence that natural and
supernatural explanations often offer individuals
distinct, complementary causal information thereby
contributing to our understanding of how and
why these explanatory frameworks continue to
coexist across development. Both kinds of explana-
tory frameworks provide a basis for interpreting
phenomena of fundamental concern to all humans.
Furthermore, we have presented converging devel-
opmental data from diverse cultural contexts dem-
onstrating that natural explanations involving
natural or scientific causes and supernatural expla-
nations involving divine or religious causes are used
by the same individuals to interpret the same to-be-
explained phenomena. Despite the diversity of the
cultural settings we have reviewed, we find essen-
tially similar patterns of coexisting explanations
(Evans et al., 2011).
The research summarized here indicates that the
endorsement of allegedly competing epistemologies
is commonplace in both Western and non-Western
contexts among both children and adults. The
developmental evidence for this phenomenon
spans highly diverse cultural contexts, ranging
from India to Madagascar. Across three different
domains, notably the origin of species, illness, and
death, there is considerable evidence for explana-
tory coexistence and for the proposal that from a
psychological perspective, natural and supernatural
explanatory frameworks are both invoked in con-
sistent, predictable ways. Individuals use several
forms of coexistence thinking (i.e., target-depen-
dent, synthetic, and integrated) that differ in the
extent to which and the means by which they inte-
grate natural and supernatural explanations. More-
over, we anticipate that the coexistence of different
explanatory frameworks extends beyond the emo-
tionally charged domains that we have discussed.
For example, accounts of procreation, wrongdoing
and marriage frequently recruit both natural and
supernatural frameworks, as described earlier.
Contrary to traditional accounts of cognitive
development, the evidence that we have presented
shows that supernatural explanations do not wane
or disappear with age. If anything, in both industri-
alized and developing countries supernatural expla-
nations are frequently endorsed more often among
adults than younger children. This provides evi-
dence against a replacement model of supernatural
thinking (e.g., Piaget, 1928) and confirms instead
that reasoning about supernatural or divine powers
is an enduring aspect of cognitive development. As
early as ages 3 to 5 years, children begin to use
multiple epistemologies, sometimes to complement
one another, often synthesizing them into a single
explanatory system.
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We anticipate both increasing compartmentaliza-
tion and coherency in coexistence thinking across
development, contingent upon personal values and
cultural differences in how natural versus supernat-
ural knowledge is organized (D’Andrade, 2008;
Shweder et al., 1997). Indeed, metacognitive skills
and cognitive flexibility likely facilitate both the
capacity to increasingly compartmentalize natural
and supernatural explanations (as in the nonover-
lap account mentioned previously) as well as the
capacity to reflect on potentially contradictory
belief systems and integrate different kinds of
explanations. Thus, rather than view nonoverlap or
integration as representing incoherent reasoning,
we view both as cognitively demanding and argue
that both can potentially be understood as concep-
tual achievements.
Although a substantial amount of cognitive
developmental research has documented concep-
tual change as involving the integration of hitherto
separate or even competing concepts into a more
complex whole (Carey, 2009), the relative dearth of
research on supernatural cognition and the persis-
tence of the replacement model has, to date,
precluded the possibility that such conceptual inte-
gration can straddle the natural–supernatural
divide. However, as emphasized previously, we
speculate that integrated accounts of natural and
supernatural explanations vary considerably based
on cultural and individual differences in beliefs
and values, especially if the two explanatory frame-
works are typically invoked in different contexts to
account for different aspects of the same phenome-
non.
The research that we have described illustrates
the impact of adult thinking on children. As chil-
dren assimilate cultural concepts into their belief
systems, from God to atoms to evolution, they
engage in several kinds of coexistence thinking.
Thus, when children live in a culture where multi-
ple epistemologies are common, they may be more
willing to embrace what may seem to be contradic-
tory explanations to reason about illness, death,
and the origin of species. Nevertheless, we still do
not have a complete understanding of why certain
individuals engage in one kind of coexistence
thinking or another. In particular, we do not have a
complete understanding of why some individuals
are able to provide an integrated form of coexis-
tence reasoning.
Why do some children and adults adopt a single
explanatory approach when confronted with com-
peting epistemologies? Why do other children and
adults treat different epistemologies as complemen-
tary rather than competing worldviews? It is plau-
sible that some individual differences are due to
the ways in which adults convey their own coexis-
tence thinking to children, but it is also conceivable
that certain cognitive characteristics influence
whether a child adopts a single consistent explana-
tion, a coexistence explanation, or attempts to unify
seemingly contradictory ideas into an integrated
explanation. We anticipate substantial individual
differences in coexistence reasoning. Indeed, cogni-
tive development is characterized by heterogeneity
and variability (Siegler, 2005) and it is unlikely that
development is any more uniform with respect to
coexistence thinking.
For adults, we suggest that some sort of cogni-
tive confluence can trigger the effort to create a
coherent, integrated model of different epistemolo-
gies. More specifically, we speculate that certain
types of encounters and interactions with others
lead adults to activate and compare different forms
of explanation. This kind of concurrent activation
has often been reported by individuals with strong
Christian fundamentalist beliefs who are brought
into contact with scientific evidence for evolution
that appears, at first sight, to challenge those beliefs
(Numbers, 1992; Poling & Evans, 2004).
Such concurrent activation may also occur in
young children. We argue that contextual informa-
tion, which is used to help reconcile both kinds of
explanations, and cultural experience influences the
interpretive frame for a particular event and sub-
sequent attempts to achieve explanatory coherence.
For example, the discussion that surrounds the
death of a loved one may prompt children to
combine the different explanations, secular as well
as religious that are provided at home, school, and
church, so as to achieve a more integrated frame-
work. Importantly, in all cases, the issue of which
explanations enter into the mix is clearly dependent
upon the kind of ideas that an individual is
exposed to in their family of origin and their
broader culture.
The assimilation of findings on explanatory coex-
istence calls for the re-evaluation of the standard
theoretical assumption that natural and supernatu-
ral explanations compete. Developmental data
spanning diverse cultural contexts in a variety of
domains crucial to human understanding do not
support replacement models; natural explanations
do not necessarily replace supernatural explana-
tions following gains in knowledge, education, and
technology. Given the breadth of the empirical data
for explanatory coexistence, we hope that this
review will pave a new path for research, one that
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treats supernatural cognition as an integral part of
cognitive developmental theory and not as an early
or primitive mode of thinking that is outgrown in
the course of cognitive development.
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